The paradox we address is that mentally, Nokia’s top management was fully prepared to meet new competitors with an ‘agile’ mentality and willingness to keep the organisation in a constant state of ‘structured chaos’ (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). Doz and Kosonen ( 2010) define this concept largely based on their experience at Nokia through the organisational capability to quickly change strategic direction using strategic sensitivity, resource fluidity, and top management leadership unity. Regarding organisational design choices, we focus on Nokia’s dominant management philosophy of the era, called ‘strategic agility’ – and its antecedents and consequences.
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With respect to technology choices, we ask the following question: Why did Nokia invest so heavily in its own more or less outdated Symbian software platform even after major competing smartphone platforms – iOS and Android – emerged in 2005–2007 and quickly proved themselves hugely successful? Subsequent question – if and when Symbian development was so difficult and expensive – is the reason why Nokia at the same time also invested in other platform options (at least MeeGo, Maemo, Android, and Meltemi platforms)? Further, all this happened during the critical years after iPhone’s emergence and would have required building extensive technological capabilities to implement any of these alternatives accordingly. By technology choices, we refer broadly to stop-go decisions concerning specific technologies and research and development processes and by organisational design we refer to choices concerning organisational structure and incentives. Our empirical focus is thus on technology choices and decisions concerning organisational design.
Following Van Rooij’s ( 2015) lead, we aim to find a solution that is both theoretically sound and respects historical reality from Nokia’s strong technological dominance in the early 2000s – being global market leader with almost 40 per cent share from mobile phone markets in 2008 (see Appendix 3) – to the divestment of its entire mobile phone business unit to Microsoft in 2013. Earlier research on Nokia’s misfortunes has found both simple answers (Vuori & Huy, 2016) and very complex ones (Cord, 2014 Doz & Wilson, 2017 Risku, 2010) to this question. Considering its technology and organisational design choices, we examine how and why Nokia failed to safeguard its strong market leadership in the global mobile phone market between 20. In this article, we provide an historical analysis of the strategic decision-making process at the Nokia Corporation. Nevertheless, its major strategic decisions towards the end of the period of analysis made the situation worse and aggravated the company’s plight. Nokia was by no means a passive follower of the novel competitive landscape dominated by the emergence of the smartphone.
Langlois, 1992 Finkelstein, 2006, Van Rooij, 2015) as the case of the Nokia Corporation between 20. In business history, we can think of very few other cases in which new competitors so quickly and forcefully dethroned an overwhelmingly dominant market leader (cf.
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